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ARTICLES
The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction
of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
Marc I. Steinberg *
Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr.**
Insider trading, a hotly debated issue for several years,1 has
been the subject of vigorous Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") enforcement and criminal prosecution.2 This "war" has
seen both its victories4 and defeats5 for the government. In many
of these cases, the prosecution must rely on circumstantial evi-
dence6 and uncertain fiduciary duty principles. 7 This is largely
due to the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. ChiarellaP
and Dirks v. SEC construing section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
• Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University
School of Law. Copyright 1992 by Marc I. Steinberg. All rights reserved.
** J.D., Southern Methodist University School of Law.
I The subject of insider trading (and its propriety) has been addressed at length.
See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982); Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970); William K.S. Wang, Trading
on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can
Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lob-5, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); sources discussed in MARC I.
STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
§§ 2:07-:15, 6:11 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
3 For a description of this "war" on insider trading, see DAVID A. VISE & STEVE
COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET 49 (1991) (referring to "the SEC's war on insider trading").
4 See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
5 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S.
222 (1980); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
6 See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
8 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
9 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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change Act of 1934.10 Yet, unlike section 10(b), section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act deals explicitly with insider trading." It
is ironic that, at the same time that the SEC is vigorously pursuing
alleged insider traders, it has relaxed the mandates of section 16,
thereby making trading by certain insiders on confidential infor-
mation more difficult to police. 2 Coupled with recent judicial
decisions addressing section 16,13 the SEC's conduct constricts
the scope of this remedial statute.
Section 16(b) is an integral part of the regulatory framework
enacted by Congress to proscribe the use of confidential informa-
tion by corporate insiders in the trading of equity securities of
their issuers. 4 Section 16 seeks to prevent such abuses of inside
information by means of a threefold attack: First, section 16(a)
requires certain insiders to file reports with the SEC of their equi-
ty security holdings and transactions in the issuer's securities;"
second, section 16(c) prohibits such insiders from transacting
short sales in the issuer's equity securities; 6 and, third, section
16(b) entitles the issuer or a security holder bringing suit on its
behalf to recover "short-swing" profits derived from the purchase
10 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
11 Id. § 78 p.
12 -See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part 1.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Direc-
tors and Principal Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 28,869 [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,709 (Feb. 8, 1991); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1984).
15 See Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, Ex-
change Act Release No. 18,114 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 26,062
(Sept. 24, 1981):
Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act provides that every person who is di-
rectly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class
of equity security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to Sec-
tion 12, or who is an officer or director of the issuer of such security, shall file
with the Commission an initial report disclosing the amount of all equity secu-
rities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner . . . . If the registered
security is also listed on a national securities exchange, such ownership reports
must also be filed with the exchange.
Id. at 19,063-66. The filing of ownership reports pursuant to § 16 has been most recently
updated in Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, 84,709.
As noted by Professor Louis Loss, these reports are readily available to the public
both at the SEC and at the relevant exchange and are widely distributed by subscription.
2 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1039 n.9 (2d ed. 1961). See Whittaker v. Whittaker
Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 n.10 (9th Cir. 1981).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988).
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and sale (or sale and purchase) by a subject insider of such
issuer's equity securities within a six month period.
7
Under section 16(b), an irrebuttable presumption is created
when "insiders" engage in such short-swing transactions. The prof-
its"8 that the insider gained by the transactions are recoverable by
an issuer that initiates a suit or, if it declines to do so, in a prop-
erly instituted shareholder's suit expressly authorized by the stat-
ute.1 9 Moreover, intent to profit from a transaction that falls with-
in the statute's scope is unnecessary for recovery. 2' According to
the Seventh Circuit, as well as other courts, an insider is "deemed
capable of structuring his dealings to avoid any possibility of taint
and therefore must bear the risks of any inadvertent miscalcula-
17 In its entirety, § 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any inten-
tion on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may
be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf
of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after. request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transac-
tions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not com-
prehended within the purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). There are certain exceptions to this general rule which are discussed
elsewhere in this article.
18 In view of the statute's broad remedial nature, a strict formula for computing
"profit realized" has been established. Such a formula is designed to "squeeze all possible
profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent
any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder
and the faithful performance of his duty." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). The formula established matches the lowest
price in with the highest price out, thus ensuring recovery of all possible profits. See, e.g.,
id.; Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981); Morales v. Consolidated
Oil & Gas, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,796 (July 17,
1982).
19 See § 16(b), supra note 17.
20 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., 527 F.2d 335, 347 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
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tion."2' The fact that an unwary party may inadvertently violate
section 16(b) has been held to be within the statute's remedial
scope. 22
Despite judicial and regulatory recognition of Congress's in-
tent to create a broad remedy combatting insider trading under
section 16(b), 23  recent court decisions and SEC administrative
rules have constricted the usefulness and availability of this reme-
dy. This constriction of section 16(b) contravenes Congress's
broad remedial purpose in enacting section 16(b). According to
the Supreme Court, Congress intended to "curb the evils of insid-
er trading [by] . .. taking the profits out of a class of transactions
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably
great."24 Moreover, the narrowing of the remedy provided in sec-
tion 16(b) does not comport with the principle of construction
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co.25 There, the Court clearly set forth that "where alter-
native constructions of the terms of section 16(b) are possible,
those terms are to be given the construction that best serves Con-
21 Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970) (imposing strict liabili-
ty upon a § 16 violator regardless of intent), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); see also
Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 523 F.2d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[T]he unwary who fall
within [§ 16's] terms have no one but themselves to blame."); Western Auto Supply Co.
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 1965) (having inadvertently failed to
structure the transaction(s) so as to avoid the strictures of § 16, such failure "subjects
[the insider] to the disciplinary effect of § 16(b), regardless of the legitimate purpose for
which the shares were destined").
22 See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972)
("[C]ourts have recognized that the only method Congress deemed effective to curb the
evils of insider trading was a flat rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions in
which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great."). In Bershad the court
stated:
In order to achieve its goals, Congress chose a relatively arbitrary rule capable of
easy administration. The objective standard of Section 16(b) imposes strict liabili-
ty upon substantially all transactions occurring within the statutory time period,
regardless of intent of the insider or the existence of actual speculation. This
approach maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate speculative abuses by
reducing difficulties in proof. Such arbitrary and sweeping coverage was deemed
necessary to insure the optimum prophylactic effect.
Bershad, 428 F.2d at 696.
See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, 84,709. ("Section 16 is a strict liability provision under which
an insider's profits can be recovered regardless of whether the insider actually was in
possession of material, nonpublic information.").
23 See supra notes 21-22.
24 Reliance, 404 U.S. at 422.
25 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
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gressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate
insiders. "26
The recently promulgated SEC rules and judicial precedent
impacting upon the parameters of section 16(b) are the focus of
this article. First, this work will address the issue of standing to sue
under section 16(b), focusing on the ramifications of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Gollust v. Mendelt 7 as well as other
cases.2' As will be seen, an allegedly aggrieved shareholder's
standing to sue remains unresolved in a number of critical situa-
tions. Second, the applicable section 16(b) statute of limitations
will be addressed. The statute, while providing that no suit may be
commenced more than two years after the alleged short-swing
trading,' leaves open the question whether equitable tolling prin-
ciples apply."0 In Lampf v. Gilbertson,s' the Supreme Court, con-
struing the statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act,3 2 adopted a limitations period precluding the appli-
cation of equitable tolling.3 Hence, the important issue arises,
which this aspect of the Article seeks to resolve, whether Lampfs
rationale should be extended, to section 16(b) actions. Third, the
work will examine the SEC's treatment of derivative securities,
such as stock options, under the section 16 regulatory framework.
As will be discussed, the SEC, pursuant to its recent rule amend-
ments,3 4 exempts from coverage, after a six-month holding peri-
od, an insider's exercise of an option and the immediate sale of
the underlying security.35 This -position leaves the door open for
insider abuse and represents a rather ironic step for the. Commis-
26 Id. at 424. Not surprisingly, critics assert that § 16 is unduly broad, no longer
necessary, and should be repealed. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient
Deternrnce of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FoRDHAM L. REv. 309 (1989);
William H. Painter, How to Control Insider Trading, A.B.A. J., March 1, 1987, at 38; S.S.
Samuelson, The Prevention of Insider Trading A Proposal for Revising Section 16 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511 (1988).
27 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991).
28 See infra notes 60-128 and accompanying text.
29 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
30 See infra Part III.
31 111 S. CL 2773 (1991).
32 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
33 Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2781. As will be discussed, the Court adopted a limitations
period for § 10(b) actions of one year after discovery and in no event more than three
years after the alleged violation. See infra notes 139-55 and accompanying text.
34 Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, 1 84,709.
35 See infra notes 156-99 and accompanying text.
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
sion to take in view of its declared "war" on insider trading. An
even more puzzling SEC action is the subject of the Article's final
Part, namely, the Commission's deletion from section 16's scope
the purchase (or sale) by an individual before she becomes an
officer or director and the subsequent offsetting transaction after
such person attains insider status.3 6 This position conflicts with
every major court decision and raises issues relating to both the
validity and wisdom of the SEC's action. Hence, during a time in
which insider trading is being vigorously prosecuted by the govern-
ment, the Commission has relaxed a number of rules in this area.
The SEC's actions, in conjunction with the ramifications of certain
recent Supreme Court and other decisions, present an opportunity
to provide an in-depth analysis focusing on the viability of the
section 16 framework from both a legal and policy perspective.
I. STANDING TO SUE
A. Introduction
Under section 16(b), the profits gained by an insider in a
short-swing transaction are recoverable by the issuer in a suit initi-
ated by it, or if it declines to do so, in a properly instituted securi-
ty holder's suit expressly authorized by the statute.3" Specifically,
section 16(b) provides that the plaintiff must be the "owner of [a]
security" of the "issuer" at the time the suit is "instituted. 38 Any
"security," such as warrants, convertible debentures, bonds, puts,
calls, and a variety of other financial instruments, will suffice to
confer standing. 9 The "owner" of a security has been construed
to include both record and beneficial owners.' The number of
36 See infra notes 200-42 and accompanying text.
37 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). In part, § 16(b) provides that "suit to recover such profit
may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer,
or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issu-
er .... " Id.
38 Id. See also § 16, supra note 17.
39 Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991); see also 16 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION
16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT § 3.09[21 (1989).
40 JACOBS, supra note 39, § 3.09[21; see also Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963); Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Additionally, the plaintiff is not required to show that she owned stock in the issuer
at the time the § 16 violation occurred. See Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
see also Gollust, 111 S. Ct. at 2179-80 (plaintiff may have to show that he/she owned a
security of the issuer at the time of the merger and filed a § 16 claim prior to such
transaction in order to have standing under § 16(b)).
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securities that must be owned to commence a'section 16(b) action
need only be minimal.41 The construction of the term "issuer" in
the phrase "the owner of any security of the issuer" has given rise
to a host of standing issues under section 16(b).42
For example, in an arms-length merger, if the issuer of the
subject securities is extinguished with the other corporation to the
merger surviving, the question arises whether the surviving corpo-
ration or its security holders may step into the issuer's shoes and
have standing to sue. A similar scenario occurs when a corporation
is merged into the original issuer with the original issuer being
the surviving corporation. On the other hand, if the subsidiary
corporation is merged into the parent, the pertinent issue is
whether the parent or its security holders may maintain a section
16(b) action.4" Moreover, standing issues involving the construc-
tion of the term "issuer" occur in the triangular merger setting."
This common acquisition technique may implicate section 16(b)
standing issues: namely, when an issuer whose stock is traded in
violation of section 16(b) is merged into the subsidiary of another
corporation and the issuer's stockholders receive shares in the
parent corporation.45 There are several possible plaintiffs in this
situation: (1) the surviving corporation; (2) the parent; (3) a for-
mer security holder of the acquired corporation who now holds
shares in the parent corporation; and (4) any security holder of
41 JAcOBS, supra note 39, § 3.09[2]; see also Gollust, 111 S. CL at 2179 (there is no
restriction, for purposes of standing to sue to recover insider short-swing profits, in terms
of either the number or percentage of shares or the value of such security that must be
held by the plaintiff); Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1981) (owner of
one security permitted to bring § 16(b) action).
42 JAcoBs, supra note 39, § 3.09[2]. A standing issue not discussed in the text arises
when an issuer sells all or substantially all its assets. Id. According to Jacobs: "When an
issuer sells all or substantially all of its assets, standing issues should be resolved as if the
issuer merged into the purchasing entity." Id § 3.0415][c], 3.09[2]; see also Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
43 An equally difficult issue is whether the parent and its security holders have
standing to bring suit after the issuer is merged into its subsidiary.
44
In a triangular merger the acquiring corporation creates a subsidiary, taking all
of the subsidiary's stock in exchange for the amount of the acquiring
corporation's stock that is to be transferred to the shareholders of the target
corporation in the merger. The target is then merged into the new subsidiary,
with the target's shareholders receiving, instead of shares in the subsidiary, as in
an ordinary merger, shares of its parent, the acquiring corporation. The result is
then that the subsidiary becomes the owner of the target's business.
LEWIs D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLIcIES 947 (1982).
45 JACOBS, supra note 39, § 3.09[2].
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the parent.' The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gollust v. Mendell'e dealt with the construction of the term "issu-
er" under section 16(b) and will likely have a significant impact
on these issues.
B. Gollust v. Mendell
In Gollust, a stockholder of an issuer whose shares were traded
in violation of section 16(b) initiated an action under section
16(b) for recovery of short-swing profits.4" Subsequently, the issu-
er was merged into a shell corporation that was wholly owned by
another entity ("the corporate parent")." The shareholders of
the issuer, including the plaintiff, received stock in the corporate
parent."0 The Court expressly stated that the issue to be decided
was whether a stockholder who had properly instituted a section
16(b) action could continue the action after a merger involving
the issuer resulted in the exchange of the stockholder's interest in
the issuer for stock in the issuer's new corporate parent.5 The
Court held, as long as the plaintiff owned a "security" of the "issu-
er" at the time the section 16(b) action is "instituted," 2 standing
exists.5
3
The Gollust Court further qualified its holding by requiring
that the plaintiff security holder maintain some financial interest
in the outcome of the litigation. 4 In this regard, the Court held
that an adequate financial stake can be maintained when the
plaintiff's interest in the issuer has been replaced by one in the
issuer's new corporate parent.5 The Court refused to read any
further condition into the statute in order for standing to exist,
other than the requirement that a section 16(b) plaintiff maintain
46 Id.
47 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991).
48 Id at 2176. The action was initiated only after demand on the issuer was made
and more than 60 days had passed without the issuer instituting the action.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2176-77.
51 Id. at 2178.
52 Id. at 2179 (The Court defines "institute" to mean "inaugurate or commence; as
to institute an action." (quoting BLAcK'S LAW DICTiONARY 985-86 (3d ed. 1933)); see
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (6th. ed. 1990) (same definition); RANDOM HOUSE UN-
ABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 988 (2d ed. 1987) ("to set in operation;
to institute a lawsuit.").
53 GoUust, 111 S. Ct. at 2179, 2181.
54 Id at 2180-81. The Court stated that a § 16(b) claim could not be maintained by
someone who is subsequently divested of any interest in the outcome of the litigation.
55 Id. at 2181.
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a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation sufficient to
motivate its prosecution and avoid constitutional standing difficul-
ties."
C. Implications of Gollust v. Mendell
1. Types of Transactions
a. Cash-out Mergers
At first glance it seems that the Court's decision in Gollust is
broad; however, it actually may be quite limiting. First, the deci-
sion in Gollust evidently precludes security holders of an issuer
involved in a cash-out merger from bringing suit under section
16(b)." This is because Gollust requires plaintiffs to maintain
some continuihg financial interest in the outcome of the litigation
to have standing to sue under section 16(b).5 Since security
holders of the issuer who have been cashed-out do not have such
a continuing financial interest, it follows that they do not have
standing under section 16(b). 9
The inequity of such a result is demonstrated in Rothenberg v.
United Brands Co.' and Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Industries.61 In
Rothenberg, the plaintiff-shareholder filed a section 16(b) claim one
day prior to the issuer being involved in a short-form cash-out
merger.62 The court held that the plaintiff must maintain stand-
ing as a shareholder throughout the litigation to bring a section
16(b) claim.' Granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court reasoned that a non-shareholder, or one who
56 Id.
57 Cf Gollust, 111 S. Ct at 2180-81. See also supra note 43.
58 Go!!ust, 111 S. Ct at 2181 ("[A] Section 16[b] plaintiff [must] maintain a financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation sufficient to motivate its prosecution and avoid
constitutional standing difficulties.").
59 See Rothenberg v. United Brands Co., [19774978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,045, at 91,690 (May 11, 1977) (shareholders entitled to receive in the
issuer cash in a cash out merger have no continuing financial interest), affid mem., 573
F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977); JACOBS, supra note 39, § 3.09[2] ("[A] stockholder of an issuer
whose shares have been converted upon consummation of a cash merger into the right
to receive cash cannot continue to maintain a Section 16(b) suit, even if he has not
surrendered his stock certificates.").
60 Rothenberg, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,045, at
91,690 (May 11, 1977) (plaintiff must maintain some continuing financial interest in the
outcome of the litigation to have standing to sue under § 16(b)).
61 607 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1979).
62 Rothenberg, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,690.
63 Id at 91,691. The court felt that this requirement was implicit in the nature of
any derivative action where the recovery will inure to the benefit of the corporation. Id
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loses his status as a shareholder during the course of the litigation
because of a cash-out merger, can gain no possible advantage
from a corporate recovery and should therefore be precluded
from bringing suit under section 16(b).' Similarly, in Portnoy, the
issuer was involved in a cash-out merger five days after the
plaintiff-shareholder filed his section 16(b) claim. 5  Citing to
Rothenberg, the court held that the plaintiff in a section 16(b)
action must maintain his shareholder status throughout the pen-
dency of the lawsuit, and that an action will abate if the plaintiff
loses such status before the litigation ends.' Since after the cash-
out merger the plaintiff in Portnoy had no such continuing inter-
est, the court held that he lacked standing to bring the section
16(b) action.
In denying the shareholder standing to sue under section
16(b), Rothenberg and Portnoy focused on whether the plaintiff
would receive a personal financial benefit, either directly or indi-
rectly (in terms of increased shareholder equity), upon the resolu-
tion of the suit. Holding that the plaintiffs had no personal inter-
est in the claim after the cash-out merger, the courts in Rothenberg
and Portnoy dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing.
This interpretation seems to comport with the literal language of
the statute.6
64 Id. at 91,692. The court stated: "To permit former shareholders to sue under Sec-
tion 16(b) . . . allow[s] persons with no continuing financial interest in the outcome of
litigation to constitute themselves the recipients of letters of marque and reprisal." Id.
65 Portnoy, 607 F.2d at 766.
66 Id. at 767. The court reasoned that a non-shareholder or one who loses interest
during the course of the 'litigation may not pursue the litigation adequately. Id.
67 Id. In so holding, the court noted the severe nature of this decision: "[W]e con-
sider the result in this case to have the appearance of being a harsh one in that a possi-
ble violation will apparently go uncorrected . . . ." Id. at 769. The court, however, felt
that the harshness of the decision was minimized since the plaintiff had not argued that
the merger which cut off his standing was accomplished for the fraudulent purposes of
avoiding enforcement of the § 16(b) claim. Id. This position is inconsistent with § 16(b)
which holds violators strictly liable without regard to their subjective intent. See, e.g.,
Sterman v. Ferro Corp., 785 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Section 16(b) imposes a
strict liability upon transactions coming within its parameters and this court has long rec-
ognized that consideration of issues such as motive, intent and the use or abuse of in-
side information is irrelevant in analyzing actions under its mandates."); see also supra
notes 20-22.
68 Section 16(b) provides in pertinent part: "Suit to recover such profit may be in-
stituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). "Issuer" is de-
fined in the statute as "any person who issues or proposes to issue any security." 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8).
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Nonetheless, when deciding standing issues under section
16(b), courts should also focus on the congressional intent under-
lying section 16(b). By ascertaining such intent, Congress's objec-
tives in enacting the applicable statute will be effectuated. Limiting
section 16(b)'s eligibility threshold to those with a continuing
financial interest, as a precondition to bringing suit, appears con-
trary to section 16(b)'s rationale. Indeed, in making the
shareholder's personal financial stake the key issue, such interest
being often minimal at best and not the shareholder's key motiva-
tion, the courts are ignoring the purpose behind section 16(b).
Section 16(b) was enacted to provide -a broad remedy to
"curb the evils of insider trading [by] . . taking the profits out of
a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was be-
lieved to be intolerably great." Allowing corporate insiders to
avoid section 16(b) liability by using their- leverage to induce a
cash-out merger contradicts this purpose. If plaintiffs who objected
to the merger"0 were allowed to continue their section 16(b) ac-
tions, insiders would be unable to so simply avoid section 16(b)
liability, and congressional intent underlying section 16(b) would
be furthered. While plaintiffs may not personally benefit from the
section 16(b) recovery, the surviving corporation's recovery of the
short-swing profits would be consistent with basic principles of
unjust enrichment,7' would cause disgorgement of the insider's
ill-gotten profits, and would thereby dissuade further insider short-
swing trading abuse.
b. Arms-Length Mergers
Gollust also may have implications in arms-length stock for
stock mergers in which an issuer is merged into another corpora-
tion with the issuer's shareholders receiving stock of the surviving
corporation. After Gollust, the question arises whether the share-
holders of the issuer must have filed the section 16(b) action
before the stock for stock merger occurred to have standing under
section 16(b). To have standing, the Court in Gollust stated that
69 Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976).
70 Shareholders may object to the merger by perfecting a right to appraisal or, if
there is no right to appraisal, by objecting in writing. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
Acr §§ 13.02, 13.20-.28 (1984); SOLOMON ET AL, .upra note 44, at 953-56. Such notifica-
tion serves as proof that the shareholder maintains an adequate interest in being an
adverse party.
71 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) ("A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.").
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the plaintiff must be the "owner of [a] security of the issuer" at
the time the suit is "instituted."72 The Court adopted the dictio-
nary definition of "instituted" which generally means to "inaugu-
rate or commence: as to institute an action."7s From the Court's
language in Gollust, it appears that the shareholder receiving
shares in the corporation into which the issuer is being merged
must file suit before the merger to meet the "instituted" require-
ment as defined by Gollust. This is because the Court seems to
exclude the corporation into which the issuer is being merged
from the definition of "issuer" under section 16(b) .7 Therefore,
under this construction, filing suit after the merger as a sharehold-
er of the surviving corporation will not satisfy the standing require-
ments for a section 16(b) claim since the plaintiff will not be
"instituting" a suit against the "issuer." Again, the Court's language
in Gollust evidently narrows the parties who can bring section
16(b) claims and thwarts Congress's purpose in creating a broad
remedy under section 16(b).
c. Triangular Mergers and the Rights of a Surviving Corporation
Gollust also may impact the triangular merger situation where
a shareholder of the parent corporation seeks to bring a section
16(b) claim belonging to a corporation that has been merged into
a subsidiary of the parent corporation. Moreover, the decision may
impact on whether or not the surviving corporation itself has
standing to bring the section 16(b) claims of the now defunct
issuer which it has acquired. Based on language in Gollust, as will
be elaborated upon below, 75 there may be relatively few instances
in which section 16 may be enforced in the triangular merger
context.
2. Analysis
Nonetheless, one must remember that the Gollust Court did
not address these diverse situations. There, the Court was faced
with a relatively narrow issue. Construing the statute in what it
may have perceived in a remedial manner, the Court granted the
72 Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. CL 2173, 2176 (1991).
73 See supra note 52. The Court noted that Congress's intent in adopting this defini-
tion is corroborated by Congress's use of the word elsewhere to mean a commencement
of an action. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1988) ("action . . . may be instituted only
within five years after . . . final administrative denial"); 42 U.S.C. § 405(8)(g) (1988).
74 Cf Gollus IllI S. Ct. at 2179; see also supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 100-28 and accompanying text.
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aggrieved plaintiff standing under section 16(b). Its language
therefore may be confined to the case at bar and not viewed as a
limitation to security holder standing in other situations where the
granting of such standing would effectuate the statute's purpose.
Given that a number of standing issues may remain open, lower
court case law must be examined.
For example, in Blau v. Oppenheim,76 a stockholder of the
parent corporation was permitted to bring a section 16(b) claim
on behalf of its subsidiary, into which the original issuer had been
merged." The plaintiff, Blau, never owned shares in the issuer
and did not acquire shares in the parent until after the triangular
merger.78 The court reasoned that there was no shareholder in
the original corporation to bring suit because the shares in the
original issuer had been exchanged for shares in the parent.
Hence, a holding that would allow only non-existing shareholders
of the defunct issuer to bring suit would make section 16 unen-
forceable.79 In order to carry out the purpose of section 16, the
court broadly construed the term "issuer" to include the parent
corporation.' This construction allows a parent and its security
holders, even if they had not owned stock in the original issuer,
to bring a section 16(b) claim.81 This position, however, has been
subject to disagreement.
76 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
77 Id. at 887. The plaintiff shareholder brought suit only after making demand on
the parent corporation requesting that it or its wholly-owned subsidiary bring suit to
recover the short-swing profits realized. With no reply and the statute of limitations about
to run, the plaintiff filed the § 16(b) claim. Id at 883.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 886-87. The court stated: "[T]he very act of dissolution of the issuer and
the failure to bring suit by the date thereof would end the right of security holders to
pursue the insider and have him disgorge his profits. This hardly conforms to the essen-
tial legislative policy of Section 16(b)." Id
80 Id. at 884. The court reasoned that while "section [16(b)] makes no reference to
survivor or successor corporations of an issuer, . . . neither does it contain any bar
against the maintenance of Section 16(b) suits by such corporations or their security
owners. To deny them the right to maintain suit would serve to defeat the purpose of
the law; to accord them the right serves to further it." d at 886.
81 Id. The court noted that a holding that would allow only the shareholder of the
defunct issuer to bring § 16(b) claims would "enable unscrupulous insiders to arrange a
merger or its equivalent to thwart the recovery of short-swing profits under Section
16(b)." Id at 887. Attacking this position, the defendant stated that courts have the pow-
er "to look beyond the form of a transaction conceived in fraud" and implied that the
court should make such a determination on an ad hoc basis. Id. The court correctly
discredited the defendant's argument stating that the examination of subjective standards
based on "intent, lack of motive, or improper conduct" is exactly what § 16(b) sought to
avoid. Id. See cases cited supra notes 20-22.
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In Lewis v. McAdam,8" for example, the Ninth Circuit reached
a somewhat different conclusion. In Lewis, the plaintiff was a
shareholder in the parent corporation. By means of a triangular
merger, the parent's subsidiary had absorbed the issuer whose
shares allegedly had been traded in violation of section 16.83 The
plaintiff in Lewis, like the plaintiff in Blau, never owned shares in
the issuer and did not acquire shares in the parent until after the
issuer merged into the subsidiary.8 4 The Ninth Circuit in Lewis
affirmed a summary judgment granted against the plaintiff-share-
holder on the grounds that he did not have standing.' The
court held that "where a corporation is merged out of existence
by the wholly owned subsidiary of another corporation, the parent
corporation is not an 'issuer' within the meaning of section
16(b). 8 6 Similarly, the court held that a shareholder of the par-
ent corporation was not an "owner of any security of the issuer"
and accordingly lacked standing to institute a section 16(b) ac-
tion.87
In contrast to Blau, the court in Lewis declined to construe
the term "issuer" broadly.' Rather, the Ninth Circuit took what it
felt was a more literal approach to interpreting section 16(b). 9
The court stated that the plain meaning of section 16(b) does not
allow the parent corporation or shareholder thereof to be an
"issuer."9 The court felt that its holding that the surviving corpo-
82 762 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1985).
83 Id. at 801-02.
84 Id. at 802. (The plaintiff in Lewis brought suit only after demand was made and
subsequently denied.)
85 Id. at 804.
86 Id. The court expressly rejected the decision in Blau v. Oppenheim which held that
a "shareholder of a parent corporation may bring an action under Section 16(b) against
the director of a company that has merged into a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent
corporation." Id. at 803.
87 Id. at 804.
88 Id. at 803-04.
89 Id. The court stated:
The starting point for interpreting any statute is the plain meaning of the lan-
guage used by Congress. Absent a clearly established legislative intent to the
contrary, that language, if clear and unambiguous, will ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive, since it is generally assumed that Congress expresses its purposes
through the ordinary meaning of words it uses.
Id at 804. The Supreme Court has agreed with this interpretation in the securities law
context. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that scienter
must be shown in private damage claims under § 10(b)).
90 An "issuer" of a security is defined under § 3(a)(8) of the 1934 Act as "any per-
son who issues or proposes to issue any security . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (1988). The
'S........-. -~..-.-,-
.2' -. j 'ny.' . -
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ration in the merger was an "issuer" for section 16(b) purposes
was adequate to effectuate the congressional purpose of providing
an enforcement mechanism against short-swing insider trading
under section 16(b).91
Lewis and similar cases92 represent the lower courts' propen-
sity to deny standing to a party with an attenuated interest in the
section 16(b) claim so long as there is another party that has a
less attenuated claim.9" In drawing this distinction, however, the
courts have failed to recognize that the party having the less atten-
uated interest is often an insider or an affiliate seeking to ensure
that short-swing profits are not recovered. Hence, this judicial
demarcation line makes little sense from a practical or policy per-
spective.
Section 16(b) states that an eligible plaintiff can bring a deriv-
ative section 16(b) claim "if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to
court reasoned that: "Congress is well aware of the corporate practice of parent compa-
nies utilizing wholly owned subsidiaries in merger 'transactions. Had Congress wanted to
discourage this practice by conferring standing on shareholders of a parent corporation
whose wholly owned subsidiary absorbed the original issuing corporation, it knew how to
do so." Lewis v. McAdam, 762 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1985).
91 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 804. In Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., 607 F.2d 765 (7th
.Cir. 1979), the plaintiff-shareholder was denied standing to bring a § 16(b) claim because
the issuer in which he owned stock had been involved in a cash-out merger. Alternative-
ly, the plaintiff sought standing as the owner of securities in the parent corporation
which was in turn the parent of the corporation into which the original issuer had been
merged. The court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments which were based on the decision
in Blau, holding that the statute was clearly written and the court could not rewrite the
statute to include grandparent corporations within the definition of issuer for § 16(b)
purposes. Id. at 768.
In Portnoy, the court distinguished Blau on the grounds that in Blau the issuer no
longer existed, whereas in Portnoy the majority perceived that the issuer continued to
exist as a wholly owned subsidiary of another corporation. The court stated that since the
issuer itself along with its corporate shareholder could bring the § 16(b) action, there
was a sufficient remedy available under the statute. The court, however, implied that if
the issuer had been extinguished, as was the situation in Blau, a different result would
be required. The statutory language would only allow the shareholders of a defunct issu-
er to bring a § 16(b) claim, giving rise to an "absurd result." Under this reasoning, no
party would exist that would have standing to enforce the violation. Id. In this respect,
the court's decision is puzzling since it appears that, in fact, the issuer ceased to exist as
a corporate entity. Id. at 769 n.1 (Suygert, J., dissenting).
92 See, e.g., Lewis v. McAdam, 762 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1985); Rothenberg v. United
Brands Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,045 (May 11,
1977), af/'d without opinion, 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977); American Standard, Inc. v.
Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Newmark v.
RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
93 See, e.g., Lewis, 762 F.2d at 801-02.
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prosecute the same thereafter."94 By so creating the private right
of action under section 16(b), Congress sought to prevent interest-
ed insiders from impeding a suit's prosecution.9 5 To facilitate a
private litigant's cause of action, Congress eliminated certain pro-
cedural hurdles from section 16(b) litigation that exist in ordinary
derivative suits. For example, under section 16(b) the security
holder has the right to initiate a suit if the corporation declines to
do so at the end of the sixty day period following demand. 6 An-
other procedural advantage to bringing a derivative action under
section 16(b) is that, unlike a number of other claims under fed-
eral or state law that may be brought derivatively, 7 the indepen-
dent directors of the corporation cannot cause dismissal of the
section 16(b) claim pursuant to the business judgment rule.9 8
Given the clear congressional objective in enacting section 16(b),
it is disconcerting that some courts construe the statute in an
unduly restrictive manner. By putting the section 16(b) claims
back in the hands of interested affiliates while excluding private
litigants who admittedly have an attenuated interest in the litiga-
tion, these courts ignore the congressional intent of section 16(b),
which is to provide a broad and effective remedy to combat insid-
er "short-swing" abuse.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Gollust v.
Mendelf' may have a substantial impact on the standing issues
presented in the foregoing cases. However, due to the distinct fact
situations presented, the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
94 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
95 SeeJACOBS, supra note 39, § 3.01[1] ("Giving security holders the right to bring
suit is important since corporate officers and directors might well be reluctant to sue a
fellow officer or director.").
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966) (derivative suit
based on fraud allegedly committed by corporation's management); Eisenberg v. Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971) (derivative suit to enjoin the effectuation
of a plan of reorganization and merger).
98 See, e.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 276 n.22 (3d Cir.
1978) (it is permissible for a security holder to bring a § 16(b) claim if the issuer has
not brought suit by the end of the sixty day period following demand), cet. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979); Jones v. Freemont Energy Corp., 537 F. Supp. 300, 301 (D. Colo.
1982); Colan v. Monumental Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1023, 1027-28 (N.D. Il1. 1981). The
business judgment rule is a judicial principle that presumes propriety in a board's deci-
sion when certain conditions are met. See generaly Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979); DENNIS J. BLOcK ET
AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECToRs (3d ed.
1989).
99 111 S. CL 2173 (1991).
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Gollust on the holdings in such cases as Blau and Lewis is not
entirely clear. In Blau and Lewis the plaintiff-shareholders never
owned shares in the original issuer. In Gollust, the plaintiff owned
shares in the issuer and had instituted a section 16(b) action be-
fore the merger, To have standing under the literal language of
Obl1ust, the plaintiffs in Blau and Lewis would have had to own a
"security" of the "issuer" at the time they "instituted" the section
16(b) claim. The Court in Gollust stated that "[a]n 'issuer' of a
security is defined under section 3(a) (8) of the 1934 Act as the
corporation that actually issued the security... and does not
include parent or subsidiary corporations."1 '0 If this language is
followed in subsequent cases raising other standing issues, Gollust
will be viewed as a restrictive decision because, by defining the
term "issuer" to exclude the corporate parent, plaintiffs in a posi-
tion like those in Blau and Lewis would be unable to bring a sec-
tion 16(b) claim. Under the definition of "issuer," as set forth in
Gollust, such security holders did not own a security of the "issuer"
at the time the action was instituted. While the plaintiff in Gollust
was allowed to continue the suit while it held shares only in the
corporate parent, the Court appeared to attach great significance
to the fact that the plaintiff had previously owned stock in the
issuer and had initiated suit before the issuer's merger into the
subsidiary. It may be argued that, based on language in Gollust,
these conditions will have to be met before one can bring a sec-
tion 16(b) cause of action.
By defining the term "issuer" as excluding a corporate parent
for purposes of section 16(b), it appears that Gollust flatly rejects
the holding in Blau. Gollust also can be viewed as disagreeing in
part with the decision in Lewis'0 in that Lewis allowed the surviv-
ing subsidiary into which an issuer was merged to bring a section
16(b) claim. 02 The court in Lewis did not make a determination
as to whether the corporation into which the issuer was merged
was in fact an "issuer" as defined under section 16(b). Rather, due
100 Id at 2179.
101 The basis of the decision in Blau that allowed the plaintiff-shareholder of the cor-
porate parent to bring a § 16(b) claim was that the parent was an "issuer" for § 16(b)
purposes. See Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This position is
contrary to the language contained in Gollust, stating that a corporate parent is not an
"issuer" for purposes of § 16(b). Gollust, 111 S. Ct. at 2179. The decision in Lewis con-
curs with Gollust that a corporate parent is not an "issuer" for § 16(b) purposes. Lewis v.
McAdam, 762 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1985).
102 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 803.
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to the absence of federal law on whether a surviving corporation
can bring suit under section 16(b), the court in Lewis examined
state law to determine whether the surviving subsidiary into which
the issuer was merged inherits the original issuer's section 16(b)
cause of action. 0 The court held that the section 16(b) cause
of action was a property right, and that under the applicable com-
mon law, as codified by New York law, all property rights automat-
ically vest in the surviving corporation after a merger.10 4 There-
fore, the court held that the surviving subsidiary corporation was
vested with the rights to initiate the section 16(b) action.' This
authorized the surviving subsidiary to act in the issuer's stead for
section 16(b) purposes.10 6
In response to Lewis' adoption of state law principles to ascer-
tain the parameters of the section 16(b) right of action, one may
point to language in Gollust that a subsidiary is not considered an
"issuer" for section 16(b) purposes.107 Since the Gollust Court's
language requires that one be considered an "issuer" or security
holder thereof to have standing to bring suit under section 16,
the decision in Lewis, allowing the subsidiary into which the issuer
is merged to bring suit, is arguably contradicted by Gollust.
103 Id. at 802. The court stated that: "A cause of action under section 16(b) arises
from breach of an insider's statutory duty and is designed to safeguard property rights."
Id. at 803.
104 Id The court restated the common law rule as: "[F]ollowing a merger, a chose in
action to enforce a property right vests in the surviving corporation and no right of ac-
tion remains in the extinct corporation." I& See also Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
105 Lewis, 762 F.2d at 803.
106 Id. The decision in Lewis disallowing the parent and its shareholders who had not
owned shares in the original issuer from bringing suit was based on the premise that the
surviving subsidiary corporation would be able to bring the action and that this was suf-
ficient to effectuate the congressional purpose of providing an enforcement mechanism
under § 16(b). If the surviving corporation into which the issuer is merged does not
have standing under § 16(b) to bring a claim, which arguably is the case based on the
language of Goldust, the premise in Lewis for disallowing the parent corporation and its
shareholders to bring suit is faulty. It appears that language contained in Gollust only
permits a party owning a "security" of the "issuer" at the time the action is "instituted"
to have standing to sue under § 16(b). In defining these terms, the Supreme Court
arguably excludes the surviving subsidiary, issuer, parent and the parent's shareholders
from bringing a § 16(b) claim because they did not own shares in the issuer and/or
initiate the § 16(b) action before the merger. This being the case, there may not be an
adequate enforcement mechanism for § 16(b) violations.
107 Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. Ct 2173, 2179 (1991) ("An 'issuer' of a security is de-
fined under § 3(a)(8) of the 1934 Act as the corporation that actually issued the securi-
ty . . . and does not include parent or subsidiary corporations.").
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The better interpretation of Gollust, however, is that it merely
excludes the surviving corporation from bringing a section 16(b)
claim on the basis that such an entity is not an "issuer" under
section 16(b). The Court leaves open the question of whether the
surviving corporation can bring the action based on its status as a
legal successor in interest. In fact, courts other than Lewis have
allowed the surviving corporation to bring the acquired issuer's
section 16(b) cause of action under state law principles.' In
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,1°9 for example, the Second
Circuit held that, while a corporation into which the original issu-
er is merged is not an "issuer" as defined under section 16(b), the
surviving corporation is a legal successor in interest and has
standing to bring section 16(b) claims belonging to the acquired
corporation."' The court held that the surviving corporation
brings such claims as a successor to claims already matured, as a
chose in action of the acquired corporation.'
This analysis is consistent with predecessor-successor merger
principles.112 Moreover, several United States Supreme Court de-
cisions, which have looked to state law principles to ascertain the
parameters of the federal securities laws, provide support. For
example, in Chiarella v. United States,"' the Court held that si-
lence, absent a duty to disclose, does not give rise to liability un-
der section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5. 14 The Court examined
108 See, eg., Leuds, 762 F.2d at 803; American Standard, Inc. v. Crane, 510 F.2d 1043,
1062 (2d Cir. 1974); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 348 (2d Cir. 1970).
109 510 F.2d 1043, 1062 (2d Cir. 1974).
110 Id. at 1062.
III Id. The court stated: "While a legal successor in interest, indeed, has standing to
recover, it does so only as successor to a claim already matured, a chose in action of the
acquired corporation." Id.
112 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS COP. Acr § 11.06. The Annotation provides
that "[o]n the effective date every disappearing corporation that is a party to the merger
dissolves into the surviving corporation and the surviving corporation automatically be-
comes the owner of all real and personal property and becomes subject to all liabilities,
actual or contingent, of each disappearing corporation." 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac. ANN.
§ 11.06 at 1287 (3d ed. 1991).
113 445 U.S. 222 (1980). This case involved an employee of a financial printer who,
gained access to nonpubl ic information relating to takeover bids derived from materials
sent by prospective bidders to his employer. The employee deduced the names of the
target and acquiring companies which were to be included in the document at a later
time. The defendant purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares imme-
diately after the takeover attempts were made public.
114 Id at 230-33 (the use of nonpublic information is not a fraud under § 10(b)
unless the person has an affirmative duty to disclose such information before trading).
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
state law principles to determine whether such a duty exists.1 -
Finding that, as the jury was charged, no such duty existed under
state law, the Court held that Chiarella did not violate Rule 10b-5
by trading on inside information."1 In Dirks v. SEC," 7 the Su-
preme Court once again examined state law principles to deter-
mine whether a duty to disclose material nonpublic information
existed under the federal securities laws."' In Dirks, as in
Chiarella, the Court examined the state law fiduciary relationship
between shareholders and corporate insiders." 9 The Court held
that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation . . . only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders... and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach." 2 ' In Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, 2' the Supreme Court held that claims based solely on the
115 Id. at 229-32.
116 Id. at 231-35. The Court held that no duty to disclose existed because the defen-
dant in Chiarella had no relationship with the companies or their shareholders whose
securities he traded. Id. at 232-33. Moreover, the defendant was not a fiduciary or a per-
son in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. Id. The Court did not
address the misappropriation issue, namely that Chiarella breached a duty to his employ-
er and his employer's clients, because the jury was not adequately charged. Id at 235-37.
After Chiarella, the lower federal courts have given their approbation to the misappropria-
tion theory. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Kan.
1990); United States v. Elliot, 711 F. Supp 425 (N.D. Il1. 1989); see also Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (Supreme Court evenly divided on the misappropria-
tion issue at bar). But see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (refusal to apply misappropriation theory under circumstances of case in family
relationship context). See generally Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Ap-
proach to SEC Rule lOb-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981); Donald C.
Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciay Principle: A Post.Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1982); Wang, supra note 1.
117 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
118 Id. at 646. "Dirks dealt with the duty of a tippee to disclose or abstain from trad-
ing or tipping when he or she possesses material nonpublic information." (quoting sylla-
bus).
119 Id. at 661-62.
120 Id. at 660. The intent of the insider must be to benefit, directly or indirectly,
from the disclosure in order for a breach of the duty to shareholders to exist. Such
benefit may be shown by the insider's receipt of pecuniary gain or reputational enhance-
ment that will translate into future earnings. The requisite showing also may be made by
the insider making a gift of confidential information to the tippee. Without this motive
for personal gain, disclosure of material nonpublic information will not violate rule 10b-5.
Id. at 660-61. See generally Bruce A. Hiler, Dirks v. SEC-A Study in Cause and Effect, 43
MD. L. REv. 292 (1984); Richard M. Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16 REV.
SEC. REG. 841, 848 (1983).
121 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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fairness of transactions or internal mismanagement are best rele-
gated to state law. 122 More recently, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial
Securities,121 the Court relied on state law to construe the de-
mand on director requirement in derivative litigation under the
federal securities laws.
1 24
Given that the Supreme Court has often looked to state law
principles in ascertaining the parameters of the federal securities
laws, 121 in this instance the Court should acknowledge the surviv-
ing corporation as the legal successor in interest under state law
principles. Interpreting Gollust in this manner reaches a more
flexible result: The section 16(b) cause of action that otherwise
would have been extinguished continues to exist in the surviving
corporation. This result, however, will only have practical impor-
tance where the surviving corporation and its parent, if one exists,
are unaffiliated with the original issuer. This will not alleviate the
harsh result in cases where the surviving corporation is an affiliate
of the party who committed the section 16(b) violation. 26
Moreover, in the triangular merger situation, as represented
by Lewis and Blau, shareholders 'generally bring suit only after
their demand on the parent corporation (into whose wholly
owned subsidiary the original issuer has been merged) has been
denied or ignored. 27 Giving the surviving subsidiary the right to
bring the section 16(b) suit will not change the outcome in these
cases since the parent, which wholly owns the subsidiary, has al-
122 Id. at 477-80. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe:
Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980).
123 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
124 Id. at 1713, following Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (Court looked to state
law to determine whether the disinterested directors of a registered investment company
have the power to terminate a properly brought action based on violations of the Invest-
ment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act). In Kamen the Court opined:
[W]here a gap in the federal securities laws must be bridged by a rule that
bears on the allocation of governing powers within the corporation, federal
courts should incorporate state law into federal common law unless the particular
state law in question is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal stat-
ute.
Id. at 1713 (emphasis in original) (quoting syllabus).
125 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 113-24.
126 Se, e.g., Lewis v. McAdam, 762 F.2d.800 (9th Cir. 1985); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250
F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
127 See Lewis, 762 F.2d at 802 (the board of directors rejected the demand on the
ground that it would be unseemly and contrary to the parent's best interests); Blau, 250
F. Supp. at 883 (plaintiffs' demand, that the parent or its wholly owned subsidiary bring
the § 16(b) claim, was left unanswered).
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ready declined to bring the claim. The formal acknowledgment of
the surviving corporation's ability to bring the section 16(b) claim
therefore is often of cosmetic, not practical, value. To truly effec-
tuate congressional intent in creating a broad remedy under sec-
tion 16(b), and prevent unjust enrichment, the courts should
authorize such section 16(b) claims to be instituted by security
holders of the parent corporation. Doing so would thwart attempts
by affiliated insiders to preclude section 16(b) causes of action by
simply influencing the surviving corporation's board of directors to
refuse the demand to bring the claim.
D. Conclusion
The decision in Blau appears to best effectuate the congressio-
nal purpose of section 16 by allowing the subsidiary into which
the issuer is merged and the corporate parent and its sharehold-
ers, who never owned securities in the issuer, to bring suit for
section 16(b) violations. While not fully carrying out the statute's
objective by excluding corporate parents and their shareholders
from bringing section 16(b) claims, the decision in Lewis, at least
when the acquiring company is unaffiliated with the insiders com-
mitting the section 16(b) violation, provides some remedy against
section 16 violations by allowing the subsidiary into which the
issuer was merged to bring suit under state law principles. Howev-
er, the decision in Lewis does not go far enough because it does
not impede insiders who commit section 16(b) violations and who
are affiliated with the acquiring corporation from influencing the
acquiring corporation's board of directors to refuse demand,
thereby precluding the section 16(b) cause of action.
After the decision in Gollust, it is possible that only a share-
holder of the issuer who filed her section 16(b) claim prior to the
merger may be able to invoke the statute on behalf of the defunct
issuer.128 The Supreme Court's language in Gollust thus may ex-
clude the subsidiary, parent, and the parent's shareholders from
suing under section 16(b). The Supreme Court's language in
Gollust, which narrowly refers to parties having standing to sue
under section 16(b), contravenes the congressional purpose under-
lying section 16(b).
128 In a cash-out merger, it appears that security holders, even if they institute the §
16(b) suit prior to the merger, are precluded from continuing with the action. See supra
notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
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Significantly, by interpreting the Gollust decision as leaving
open the question of whether a surviving corporation inherits the
causes of action possessed by the corporation that was acquired,
the harsh outcome that would otherwise result is lessened. Howev-
er, to truly effectuate Congress's purpose in creating a broad rem-
edy under section 16(b), the statute should be flexibly construed
to put causes of action for the recovery of short-swing profits back
into the hands of private litigants. This approach would prevent
affiliated insiders from controlling such causes of action by way of
their influence on the board of directors of the acquiring corpora-
tion.
The confusion surrounding section i6(b) standing issues,
which is heightened by the decision in Gollust, should be clarified
by congressional action. A statute addressing section 16(b) stand-
ing issues should clearly define the parties able to bring suit in
the various situations discussed herein. Such a statute would pro-
vide a definitive expression of congressional intent on this issue
while reducing the possibility that Gollust will be narrowly con-
strued to exclude plaintiffs upon whom Congress may well have
intended to confer standing under section 16(b).
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The applicable statute of limitations for section 16(b) actions
provides that "no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized."" 9 In regard to whether
tolling of the limitations period is permitted, three positions have
been advanced: (1) the two-year period runs strictly from the time
the profits were realized, without any tolling;130 (2) the two-year
period is tolled until- the corporation had sufficient information to
put it on notice of its potential section 16(b) claim;' and (3)
the "disclosure rationale," namely, that the two-year period is
tolled until the insider discloses the transactions at issue by filing
the required section 16(a) reports. 3 2 These positions have arisen
129 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); see supra note 17, quoting § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act.
130 See Morales v. Mylan Lab., 443 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Chambliss v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Corp., 274 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), af'd, 414 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 916 (1970); Blau v. Lamb, 191 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Can--Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
131 See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir.) (not adopting
standard but setting forth its existence), cert. denied, 454 U.S.' 1031 (1981).
132 Id. at 527-30; Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. La Morte, [1973-1974 Transfer Bind-
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due to the silence of both the statute and legislative history on
the tolling issue.
1 33
In determining whether a strict or flexible interpretation of
section 16(b)'s limitations period is ultimately adopted, the
judiciary's principal focus should be on congressional intent.3 4
In Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp.,15 the Ninth Circuit opted for the
"disclosure" rationale, reasoning that, "examining the legislative
purpose of Section 16 as a whole and considering the place of the
time provision in that overall legislative scheme, we infer that
tolling of the two year time period is required when the pertinent
Section 16(a) reports are not filed.""3 6 On the other hand, the
district court in Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.'17 adhered to
a strict interpretation of the limitations period stating that "[t]he
Court is aware of no authority which would justify the [assertion]
that Congress, when it established limitations periods in the feder-
al securities acts ... , intended that such limitations periods be
'tolled' under circumstances such as those presented here."'
These decisions represent the diverse positions that the lower
courts have espoused in ascertaining congressional intent on the
tolling issue.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Lampf
v. Gilbertson"3 9 resolved the applicable limitations period for sec-
tion 10(b) claims. 40 In its decision, the Court deciphered con-
gressional intent on the tolling issue under the one-year/three-year
limitations structure provided for in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 4 1
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,429, at 95,472 (March 8, 1974); Blau v. Albert, 157 F.
Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Under § 16(a) and SEC rules thereunder, insiders are required to file reports dis-
closing their ownership interest in equity securities of the issuer and in any change
thereof. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14.
133 See Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 528; Grossman, 72 F. Supp at 378.
134 See, e.g., Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 527; Chambliss, 274 F. Supp. at 411; Car-Consolidated
Biscuit Co., 125 F. Supp. at 432; Grossman, 72 F. Supp. at 378. See generally Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2763 (1991) ("[Tlhe rule that has
emerged . . . is that recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal
statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy.").
135 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
136 Id. at 528.
137 274 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), aft'd, 414 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970).
138 Id. at 411.
139 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
140 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
141 Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2781.
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This construction may have an impact on the applicability of the
doctrine of equitable tolling to the two year limitations period
provided for in section 16(b).
The Supreme Court's decision in Lampf may be construed to
support the theory that the two year period runs strictly from the
period in which the profits were realized, without any tolling. In
Lampf, the Court held that equitable tolling is not available with
respect to actions brought under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act.'42 Because section 10(b) itself does not contain a
statute of limitations, the Court opted for the one-year/three-year
statute of limitations contained in various provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts.43 In particular, the Court chose the period speci-
fied in section 9(e) of the Exchange Act. 144 More importantly
for the discussion in the present context, the Court held that the
one-year/three-year structure is fundamentally inconsistent with the
equitable tolling doctrine.
45
The Court pointed out that "[t]he one year period, by its
terms, begins after discovery of the facts constituting the violation,
142 Id. at 2781-82.
143 Id. at 2781. Under the one-year/three-year scheme as provided in § 9(e) of the
Exchange Act, the cause of action must be brought within one year after the discovery
of the facts constituting the violation and, in any event, within three years after such
violation. Before the decision in Lampf, a number of courts applied the general rule to §
10(b) that if Congress fails to provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of ac-
tion, the court will use the local state time limitation most analogous to the case at
hand. See, e.g., Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1983). In Lampf, the court
held that there was no reason to look to state law to determine the statute of limitations
under § 10(b) because Congress has provided an express limitations period for correla-
tive remedies within the Securities Acts. Lampf, 111 S. CL at 2782.
144 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9. The Court chose § 9(e) of the 1934 Act as the
language to govern the standard for an action under § 10(b). The Court was required to
make such a choice because the language of the various one-and-three-year provisions
contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts differ slightly in terminology. Id In this regard, §
13 of the Securities Act provides the limitations period for alleged violations of §§ 11
and 12 of that Act. With respect to §§ 11 and 12(2), actions must be initiated within
one year after the facts constituting the violation were known or should have been known
to the plaintiff and in no event more than three years after the alleged violation. 15
U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (emphasis added). Hence, it appears that, for the one year period
to begin running for § 10(b) limitations purposes, the plaintiff must have actual knowl-
edge. As the Court stated: "To the extent that these distinctions in the future-might
prove significant, we select as the governing standard for an action under section 10(b)
the language of section 9(e) of the 1934 Act." Lanpf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9.
145 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782.
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making tolling unnecessary."'46 With respect to the three year
limit, the Court reasoned that this period is one of repose and
therefore is inconsistent with tolling.147 Hence, the Court con-
cluded that Congress intended that the three year limitation serve
as the final cutoff, thereby precluding equitable tolling during this
period.
148
It may be asserted that the statute of limitations applicable to
section 16(b) establishes an outside limit, a period of two years,
much like the three year outside limit under the one-year/three-
year structure. The analysis utilized in Lampf provides support for
the proposition that the Supreme Court would hold that Congress
intended to establish two years as a final cutoff for a section 16(b)
cause of action and that the doctrine of equitable tolling would
not apply.
The one-year/three-year structure, as represented by section
9(e), provides that no action shall be maintained unless brought
within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation and "within three years after such violation.'1 '  As dis-
cussed above, the Supreme Court in Lampf determined that the
three year outside limit under the one-year/three-year scheme
clearly served as a cutoff, with no tolling principles applicable to
this period. 5  Turning to section 16(b), that provision's lan-
guage states that no action shall be brought "more than two years
after the date such profit was realized."'' The similarity in lan-
guage setting forth the outside limit of both the section 16(b) and
the one-year/three-year statutes could result in the Supreme Court
construing the section 16(b) limitations period not to be subject
146 Id.
147 Id., quoting, Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims:
A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 235, 288 (1989) ("[T]he inclusion of
the three-year period can have no significance in this context other than to impose an
outside limit.").
148 Lampf 111 S. Ct at 2782. The Court appears to adopt the position of the ABA
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, that there is an "inescapable conclusion
that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply in actions under the securities
laws." Id. at 2782 (quoting the ABA COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR IMPLIED ACTIONS 645, 655
(1986)).
149 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988). Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides: "No action shall
be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years
after such violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988).
150 Lampf, 11] S. CL at 2782.
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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to the doctrine of equitable tolling, as it did the one-year/three-
year scheme. Nonetheless, critical distinctions can be drawn that
call for a result in favor of equitable tolling under section 16(b).
The statutory construction of the one-year/three-year scheme
lends itself more to an interpretation that the outside limit is an
absolute, than does the two year limitation period under section
16(b). The one-year/three-year scheme, as opposed to the two
year structure under section 16(b), has two elements: (1) the
three year limitation from the time the cause of action ac-
crues;152 and (2) a one year limitation from actual discovery of
the facts giving rise to the action.15 3 Since the one year limita-
tion period takes tolling into consideration and the three year
outside limit does not, it can be asserted that by negative implica-
tion Congress did not intend that the three year outside limit be
subject to tolling. On the other hand, while the section 16(b)
limitations period sets an outside limit, it does not by its terms
take tolling into consideration as does the one-year/three-year
framework. This distinction makes section 16(b) more susceptible
to an interpretation that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies
to the two year limitations period provided therein.
More fundamentally, section 16(b) logically affords a remedy
that presumes that the subject insider timely filed the reports
mandated by the section. To permit an insider to violate section
16(a) by neglecting its filing obligation and thereby avoid section
16(b) liability for otherwise proscribed trades conflicts with the
congressional objective of deterring insider abuse in the short-
swing trading context. In Lampf, the Supreme Court apparently
recognized the incompatibility of the section 16(b) limitations
period with that of section 10(b): "Because [section 16(b)] re-
quires the disgorgement of unlawful profits and differs in focus
from Section 10(b) and from the other express causes of action,
we do not find Section 16(b) to be an appropriate source from
which to borrow a limitations period here."'54 When presented
with the issue, the judiciary should recognize that the converse
also is true and that the period of limitations applicable to section
10(b), and the unavailability of tolling thereunder, is equally in-
compatible with the purpose and policy of section 16. At the very
152 The three-year period "accrues" upon the occurrence of the events giving rise to
the § 10(b) violation. See Lampf, III S. Ct. at 2782.
153 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
154 Lampf, II1 S. CL at 2780 n.5.
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least, due to the differences in statutory language and
countervailing policy rationales, the Supreme Court's decision in
Lampf should be construed to leave open the issue whether the
doctrine of equitable tolling applies to actions brought under
section 16(b).
Considering the construction of the two statutory schemes
along with the congressional objectives underlying section 16, the
courts should adopt the disclosure approach which allows for a
tolling period until such time as section 16(a) reports are accu-
rately filed. 5 By adopting this approach, the courts can avoid
the unwanted effect of subjecting potential defendants to the
never ending threat of litigation so long as they fulfill their sec-
tion 16(a) duties. Allowing subject defendants to successfully raise
the statute of limitations defense when they have failed to comply
with section 16(a) would thwart Congress's objectives in enacting
that provision.
III. THE SEC's TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES
Prior to the 1991 section 16 rule changes, the treatment of
the grant and exercise of options and other derivative securities
for purposes of section 16(b) was relatively settled. 56 Courts uni-
formly held that the exercise of an ordinary5 7 option or other
derivative security and the subsequent sale of the underlying secu-
rity were a purchase and sale matched for purposes of section
16(b). 5 At the same time, courts deemed the original grant or
155 This was the position adopted in Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). Moreover, if § 16(a) reports are inaccurately
filed, the statute of limitations should be tolled under the common law doctrine of
fraudulent concealment until such time as proper disclosure is made. Id. at 527 n.9. See
Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (quoting Donald C. Cook & Myer
Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (Part 1), 66 HARV. L. REV. 385,
413 (1953)).
156 JACOBS, supra note 39, § 3.04[51[e].
157 If the grant of an option is merely a device being used to conceal the transfer of
an underlying security, the courts have held the grant of the option to be a purchase of
the underlying security, which is subject to § 16(b). Id.; see, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough,
428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
158 See, e.g., Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983); Morales v.
Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Silverman
v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954). As
stated by one commentator:
[T]he most usual situation leading to Section 16(b) liability, involves exercise of
an employee stock option (under current law, such an exercise constitutes a
purchase for Section 16(b) purposes), and the subsequent sale of those shares,
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acquisition of the option a nonevent having no section 16(b)
implications." 9 Prior to the 1991 section 16(b) rule changes, the
SEC also maintained this position. 60
The Commission, however, perceived that treating the acquisi-
tion of a derivative security as a nonevent under section 16(b)
rendered the applicability of that statute to certain transactions
involving derivative securities questionable. 6' Citing the uncer-
tainty surrounding the application of section 16(b) to transactions
in derivative securities under its former rules and existing case law,
the SEC in 1991 adopted a new regulatory framework to govern
derivative securities.'62 Under the new regulatory framework, the
grant or acquisition of a derivative security is considered a pur-
chase for Section 16 purposes, with the exercise or conversion of
the derivative security being a nonevent for purposes of section
16.16' This approach reverses the SEC's previous regulatory ap-
proach and differs from cases that have held that the exercise of
the option (rather that its acquisition) is the purchase of an equi-
ty security under section 16(b).l' While restricting the ability of
insiders to utilize inside information in transactions involving de-
rivative securities, the new regulatory framework increases the
potential for abuse of confidential information by insiders in- ordi-
nary transactions involving the option's exercise followed by the
immediate sale of the underlying securities.
at a higher price, within six months.
It is surprising that so many Section 16 insiders are 'torpedoed' by that
scenario. Assuming that such persons do not knowingly self-destruct, we can only
conclude that these persons did not know about Section 16(b). We can further
conclude that the corporate issuer of the stock in question has not set up an ef-
fective pre-clearance system to prevent its Section 16 insiders from self-de-
structing.
Robert A. Barron, Some Comments on Current Questions Under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 18 SEC. REG. LJ. 194, 195 (1990).
159 See, e.g., Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983); Morales v.
Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Silverman
v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
160 See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, at 81,258 (portions of thisr section outlining the new regulatory
framework are reproduced from this release).
161 Id at 81,260. The specifics of these transactions are discussed infra notes 170-72.
162 See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, at 81,258.
163 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a), (b) (1991).
164 See, e.g., Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983); Morales v.
Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Silverman
v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
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The ambiguity of the prior SEC rules and judicial precedent
regarding the applicability of section 16(b) to certain transactions
involving derivative securities led the SEC to establish the new
regulatory scheme." 5 In establishing this framework, the Com-
mission seemed primarily concerned with three types of transac-
tions: 166 First, the transaction in which an insider purchases an
option and then, within a six-month period, instead of exercising
the option sells stock in the corporation he otherwise held;167
second, the situation in which an insider purchases options and
subsequently sells the options within a six-month period; 16 and
third, the situation in which an insider buys stock in the corpora-
tion and then buys put options. 69 Since prior SEC rules did not
address these situations, the applicability of section 16(b) to these
transactions before promulgation of the 1991 rules was problemat-
ic. Moreover, many courts did not match transactions in derivative
securities with transactions in underlying securities for short-swing
profit purposes. 7 Under the new regulatory framework, howev-
er, these transactions will be matched for short-swing profit pur-
poses.
A. 1991 Regulatory Scheme
For the first time, the term "derivative security" is defined for
purposes of section 16(b). This definition is used extensively in
determining whether a particular transaction is subject to section
16(b). Rule 16a-l(c) generally defines the term "derivative securi-
ty" as "any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation
165 Adoption of Amendments to Reporting and Trading Standards, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 28,869 [1990-1991 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,709, at
81,260 (Feb. 8, 1991).
166 Cf Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, at 81,259.
167 Id. at 81,260.
168 Id
169 Id. In establishing the new regulatory scheme for derivative securities, the Com-
mission was not concerned with the situations in which an insider purchases and sells
stock within a six-month period or purchases an option, exercises the option and then
sells the stock all within a six-month period. The profit would have been recoverable
from the insider in these two situations. Id.
170 Id. The well established judicial principle that the grant or acquisition of an op-
tion or other derivative security is a nonevent under § 16(b) results in the exclusion of
many of the derivative security transactions from § 16(b). See, e.g., Colan v. Monumental
Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983); Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir.
1976); Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1954); see alsoJAcOBS, supra note 39, § 3.04[5][c].
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right [SAR], or similar right with an exercise or conversion priv-
ilege at a price related to an equity security, or similar securities
with a value derived from the value of an equity securi-
ty.... - If a particular transaction falls within the definition
of derivative security, it will be subject to the new regulatory
framework. This framework characterizes the acquisition and dispo-
sition of derivative securities as events that are matchable against
other security transactions characterized as events in which the
insider engaged.
1 72
171 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(c) (1991).
Exclusions from the definition of "derivative security" include, but are not limited
to:
(1) rights of a pledgee of securities to sell the pledged securities; (2) rights of
all holders of a class of securities of an issuer to receive securities pro rata, or
obligations to dispose of securities, as a result of a merger, exchange offer, or
consolidation involving the issuer of the securities; (3) securities that may be
redeemed or exercised only for cash and do not permit the receipt of equity
securities in lieu of cash, if the securities either: (i) are awarded pursuant to an
employee benefit plan satisfying the provisions of § 240.16b-3(c); or (ii) may be
redeemed or exercised only upon a fixed date or dates at least six months after
award, or upon death, retirement, disability, or termination of employment; (4)
interests in broad-based index options, broad-based index futures, and broad-
based publicly traded market baskets of stocks approved for trading by the ap-
propriate federal governmental authority; (5) interests or rights to participate in
employee benefit plans of the issuer; or (6) rights with an exercise or conver-
sion privilege at a price that is not fixed.
Id. § 240.16a-1(c)(1)-(6) (1991). If the transaction falls outside the definition of derivative
security, only the purchase or sale of the underlying security will be considered an event
for purposes of § 16(b). Id.
172 Ownership, Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, at 81,260.
Under the 1991 regulatory framework, acquisitions of call derivative securities from
an issuer or third party are deemed purchases for purposes of § 16 and are matchable
with any disposition of the underlying security (or other call equivalent position related
to the same class of underlying security) for purposes of short-swing profit recovery. Like-
wise, acquisitions of put equivalent positions are matchable with any acquisition of the
related underlying security (or any disposition of a put equivalent position related to the
same class of underlying securities). Derivative securities which contain a floating exercise
price are deemed to be acquired when the purchase price of the underlying security
becomes due. If the timing of the event fixing the price is outside the control and
knowledge of the holder, then the acquisition would be reportable'as of the date of the
event fixing the price. Such an acquisition would be exempt from § 16(b) matching with
sales occurring before the fixing of the exercise price, but would not be exempt from §
16(b) matching with sales occurring thereafter. Id. at 81,264-65.
Dispositions of derivative securities are reportable events representing changes in
beneficial ownership of the underlying securities, as well as in the derivative securities
themselves, and are therefore subject to the short-swing profit recovery provisions of §
16(b). Dispositions of call derivative securities are matchable with any acquisition of relat-
ed underlying securities (or other call equivalent position related to the same class of
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B. Implications of the New Regulatory Scheme
The concept that a derivative security is the functional equiva-
lent of its underlying security for the purposes of section 16 forms
the basis for the new regulatory framework. 173 For section 16
purposes, the SEC felt that the functional equivalent of derivative
securities and their underlying equity securities required that the
acquisition of the derivative securities, not the exercise, be
deemed the significant event. 174 The SEC attributed little impor-
tance to the exercise of the option based on the belief that the
exercise of a derivative security merely changes the form of benefi-
cial ownership from indirect to direct.
175
The SEC felt that the former regulatory scheme, which treat-
ed the exercise rather than the grant of the derivative security as
the significant event for section 16(b) purposes, left open a signifi-
cant potential for short-swing profit abuse in trading derivative
securities. 176 By matching transactions in options, convertible se-
underlying securities). Likewise, dispositions of put equivalent positions are matchable
with any disposition of related underlying securities (or call equivalent positions related
to the same class of underlying securities). Id. at 81,266.
The rules also address § 16's effect upon expiration of derivative securities and
option exercises as a result of a merger. The rules make clear that the expiration or
cancellation without value of a long derivative security is exempt from § 16(b). However,
the rules provide that the expiration of a short derivative security position may yield a
profit which is subject to recovery under § 16(b). The exemption for option exercises
that existed under the former rules has been deleted in the 1991 rule changes. The
exemption is no longer necessary because the exercise of the option is exempt if it is
not out-of the money. Id.
173 Id. at 81,258. The theory underlying this position is that the value of the deriva-
tive security is a functional equivalent of or related to the value of the underlying securi-
ty. Id.
174 The SEC felt that the "[flailure to recognize that derivative securities are func-
tional equivalents of the underlying securities for Section 16 purposes could permit in-
siders to evade disgorgement of short-swing profits simply by buying call options and
selling the underlying stock, or buying underlying stock and buying put options." Id
175 The Commission stated that:
the exercise of a derivative security, much like the conversion of a convertible
security, essentially changes the form of beneficial ownership from indirect to
direct. Since the exercise represents neither the acquisition nor the disposition
of a right affording the opportunity to profit, it should not be an event that is
matched against another transaction in the equity securities for purposes of
Section 16(b) short-swing profit recovery.
Id. at 81,259.
176 The Commission stated:
Just as an insider's opportunity to profit commences when he purchases or sells
the issuer's common stock, so too the opportunity to profit commences when
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curities, warrants and similar derivative securities, the SEC hoped
to curb the potential for short-swing profits in derivative securities.
While the SEC's new regulatory framework will likely reduce
short-swing profits generated in derivative security transactions, it
does so at a cost. The cost of the new regulatory structure is in-
creased opportunity for abuse in the traditional derivative security
transaction in which a grant of an option is given, the option is
exercised, and the underlying security is sold. The increased po-
tential for abuse under the new regulatory scheme comes from
the ability of insiders to exercise options and sell the underlying
securities immediately, as long as the option has been held for at
least six months. This essentially allows insiders, subject to the
securities acts' antifraud provisions, to freely trade in the
corporation's securities after holding the option for a six-month
period. For example, upon learning of bad news, an insider hold-
ing the derivative security for six months can immediately exercise
the option and sell the underlying securities before such informa-
tion is made public, thereby taking advantage of nonpublic infor-
mation for his or her personal gain. Section 16 was enacted to
prevent this type of transaction. 7 7
C. The Regulatory Scheme's Conflict with
Judicial Precedent
An additional problem with the SEC's new regulatory frame-
work is that it directly contradicts existing judicial precedent on
this issue. The underlying assumption of the 1991 regulatory
framework is that the grant of a derivative security constitutes a
purchase for purposes of section 16(b). However, as previously
discussed, the overwhelming majority of case law holds that the
grant of a derivative security is a nonevent, not. matchable against
other purchases and sales under section 16(b).'7 8 Without this
underlying assumption, the entire regulatory framework seems to
the insider engages in transactions in options or other derivative securities that
provide an opportunity to obtain or dispose of the stock at a fixed price.
Id. at 81,258.
177 See Comments made by U.S. Senator Carl, Levin, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1485, at 7 (Feb. 5, 1992) (The SEC's "rule change means that by the time a CFO is
eligible to exercise an option, the six-month period is 'long gone' and the CFO can buy
and sell immediately.").
178 See, e.g., Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983); Morales v.
Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976); Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.
1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
19921
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
unravel. Convincing the judiciary to adopt the view that the exer-
cise of a derivative security is an exempt transaction under section
16(b) may prove problematic. Specifically, difficulty may arise in
convincing judges that the receipt of an option is equivalent to
the purchase of the underlying securities and that the actual re-
ceipt of the securities upon exercise of the option is not.
1 71
The Second Circuit in Greene v. Dietz8 ° criticized an option
exercise exemption contained in former rule 16b-3.18 1 Rule 16b-3
exempted option exercises of stock acquired pursuant to certain
types of employee benefit plans."' In dicta, the court stated that
the exemption of the option exercise contained in rule 16b-3 was
inconsistent with the congressional purpose underlying section
16.1 3 In criticizing the exemption of option exercises, the court
179 Peter I. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, The New Section 16 Regulatory Scheme, 24 REV. SEC.
& COMM. REC. 112 (1991).
180 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
181 The Second Circuit did not invalidate the rule, but merely criticized the rule in
dicta as inconsistent with the purposes and policies underlying § 16(b). Id. at 694 ("In-
deed, although not essential to our opinion, we express doubt as to the power of the
Commission to promulgate Rule [16b-3]"). The court was not required to decide the
validity of rule 16b-3 since it merely affirmed the trial court's decision on the issue of
the defendant's good faith and exculpability in relying on § 23(a). Section 23(a) provides
in pertinent part that:
No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with a rule, regulation, or order of the
Commission . . . notwithstanding that such rule, regulation, or order may there-
after be amended or rescinded or determined by judicial or other authority to
be invalid for any reason.
Id.
182 See id at 691. In pertinent part, rule 161>3 read as follows:
Any acquisitions of shares of stock or nontransferable options (other than con-
vertible stock or stock acquired pursuant to a transferable option, warrant or
right) by a director or officer of the issuer of such stock shall be exempt from
the operation of Section 16(b) of the Act if the stock or option was acquired
pursuant to a bonus, profit-sharing, retirement or similar plan meeting all of the
following conditions . ...
Id.
183 Id. at 693. The court recognized that it is the Commission's duty to promulgate
regulations that are consistent with the expressed purpose of the controlling statute. Id;
see Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1943) ("[t]he delegation serves
no other than the commendable functions of relieving the statute from imposing undue
hardship and giving it flexibility in administration"). Moreover, the court stated:
[I]ndeed, although not essential to our opinion, we express doubt as to the
power of the Commission to promulgate Rule [161>3] inasmuch as the Rule's
broad language may permit acts by insiders sought to be prevented by the Se-
curities Exchange Act. Nor, do we regard the promulgation of the Rule as a
matter solely within the expertise of the SEC and therefore beyond the scope of
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discussed the fact situation above in which an insider takes ad-
vantage of inside information by utilizing his ability to exercise the
option and immediately sell.'84 The court felt that the exemp-
tion of option exercises would allow insiders to take advantage of
nonpublic information too easily by immediately exercising their
options and selling their underlying securities upon learning of
bad news.1 85 Hence, according to the court, by requiring insiders
to hold their underlying securities for six months after they have
exercised their derivative securities would better serve the underly-
ing purposes of section 16(b). 85
District courts addressing rule 16b-3, after the decision in
Greene, have disagreed on the validity of the rule. In Perlman v.
Timberlake,18 7 the district court, following the reasoning in Greene,
found that rule 16b-3 was invalid and outside the SEC's
rulemaking authority.18 The court in Perlman agreed with Greene
that rule 16b-3, which exempted the exercise of the option from





186 Id The court stated that:
It would seem to us that such an opportunity for profit-taking by insiders in a
temporary and artificially stimulated market would be minimized, in accord with
the purpose of section 16(b), by a requirement that insiders who acquire cor-
porate stock by the exercise of employee options 'pursuant to an [employee
benefit] plan must retain their stock for at least six months after its acquisition
or, in event of their failure to do so, must account to the corporation for the
profits resulting from the sale thereof.
Id at 693.
187 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
188 Id at 251. The version of rule 16b-3 considered in Greene was amended prior to
the decision in Perlman. Id. However, the rule was substantially the same after the amend-
ments and the changes did not play a part in the court's decision in Perlman. Id.
The court in Perlman considered the criticism of rule 161>3 in Greene to be merely
dicta. Id. at 253. However, the court treated it as a holding. Id. ("I conclude that al-
though the logical effect of the expression of doubt of the Court of Appeals for practical
purposes is that of a holding, it was deliberately given the status of judicial dictum by
the Court."). The court in Perlman felt that the Greene court's expression of doubt as to
the validity of § 16(b) followed by the discussion of congressional purposes underlying §
16(b) presupposed the invalidity of rule 16(b). Moreover, the question of good faith
would not have had to be answered had the court in Greene believed that rule 16b-3 was
valid. Had the defendant in Greene not acted in good faith, the Second Circuit would
have invalidated rule 16b-3. Id. The court in Perlman, however, reserved the right to con-
sider the issue of the validity of rule 161>3 and reached its own decision based on an
independent consideration of the question. Id
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underlying section 16(b)."s9 The Perlman court went further than
the Second Circuit in Greene which merely criticized the rule, by
invalidating the rule altogether."9 In Perlman, the court stated:
"What started out as a rule [rule 16b-3] to relieve from hardship
has by constant expansion resulted in a pro tanto repeal of sec-
tion [16(b)] with respect to restricted option stock."191 Such re-
peal by regulation, implication, or judicial inventiveness, reasoned
the court, "is not favored especially on so important a piece of
legislation." 9 ' In Perlitz v. Continental Oil, 9' however, the court
reached the contrary result, upholding rule 16b-3's exemption of
an option's exercise.194 Disagreeing with the decisions in Greene
and Perlman, the court in Perlitz felt that the SEC acted reasonably
in promulgating rule 16b-3 and that no proof had been offered to
show that an increased danger of insider trading would material-
ize.1 9 Therefore, the court chose to validate the rule.' 96
In its 1991 release, the SEC attempted to address the threat-
ening precedent established in Greene and Perlman. The Commis-
sion reasoned that the exemption of the exercise criticized in
those decisions was not part of a uniform regulatory scheme gov-
erning derivative securities as is the exemption in the 1991
scheme. 197 Accordingly, the SEC asserted that the rule consid-
ered in Greene and Perlman was adopted without the corollary ap-
189 Id at 258 ("[Wle hold that Rule [16b-3] is in conflict with the expressed purpose
of the statute"). The Pertman court stated that the function of the SEC is to carry out
the legislative intent as it is clearly expressed in the statute. Id. However, the court went
on to say that the ultimate enforcement of § 16(b) is left to the courts and not to the
Commission and that "judicial review and action may always be had when the statutory
and constitutional authority for the Commission's action is absent and when it has
abused its powers . . . ." Id. at 254.
190 Id. ("[W]e hold that Rule [16b-3] is in conflict with the expressed purpose of the
statute and therefore invalid").
191 Id. at 257.
192 Id
193 176 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
194 Id. at 221; see also Gruber v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 158 F. Supp. 593, 606
(N.D. Ohio 1957) (upholding the validity of rule 16b-3).
195 Perlitz, 176 F. Supp. at 227. The Perlitz court felt that the courts in Greene and
Penman did not give due deference to the SEC's interpretation of § 16(b). Id. at 223-27.
The Perlitz court stated, that by delegating rulemaking authority to the SEC, "[Tlhe Con-
gress has expressed its confidence in the ability and integrity of the Commission in carry-
ing out the mandates thus intrusted to it." Id. at 223.
196 Id. In 1960, the SEC deleted the exemption which was contained in rule 16b-3
for stock acquired upon the exercise of options, warrants or rights. General Rules and
Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 Fed. Reg. 4902 (1960).
197 Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 14, at 81,263.
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plication of short-swing profit liability to transactions in derivative
securities.1 98 In addition, the new SEC rules recognize that deriv-
ative securities are functionally equivalent to underlying equity
securities for purposes of section 16."
Unlike the SEC, court decisions thus far generally have de-
clined to recognize that derivative securities are functionally equiv-
alent to underlying securities for purposes of section 16. If the
courts refuse to adopt the basis of the SEC's new regulatory
scheme by continuing to treat the exercise of derivative securities
as a purchase (rather than the grant of the option) for purposes
of section 16(b), the SEC's new regulatory framework may fail.
However, by promulgating a uniform regulatory framework for
derivative securities, the SEC appears to have improved its chances
of obtaining judicial acceptance of the new regulatory framework.
IV THE SEC's WAR ON INSIDER TRADING:
GIVING AWAY A CROWN JEWEL
A. Introduction
The SEC has declared "war" on insider trading;200 yet, at the
same time, the Commission is on a mission to restrict the parame-
ters of section 16. In section 16(b) cases, unlike those brought
under section 10(b), an insider is held strictly liable for transac-
tions falling within the purview of the statute. °' To prove a sec-
tion 16 violation, there is no requirement that circumstantial evi-
dence or the insider's intent be examined.0 2 Yet, the SEC falls
to make optimal use of this statute. In the 1991 amendments to
the section 16 rules, the SEC deemed pre-insider transactions by
officers and directors normally to be outside the scope of section
16. The Commission's reasons for narrowing the applicability of
198 Id
199 Id.
200 See VISE & COLL, supra note 3, at 49. Shortly after Chairman John Shad's arrival
at the SEC, he asserted that the Commission "was about to 'come down with hobnail
boots' on illegal insider trading." Id. at 53.
201 See Arrow Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1281 (5th Cir. 1986)
('[N]either actual use of insider information nor intention to exploit such information is
required to establish Section 16(b) liability."); Sterman v. Ferro Corp., 785 F.2d 162, 166
(6th Cir. 1986) ("Section 16(b) imposes a strict liability upon transactions coming within
its parameters and this court has long recognized that consideration of issues such as
motive, intent and the use of or abuse of inside information is irrelevant in analyzing ac-
tions under its mandates.").
202 Arrow Distrib. Corp., 783 F.2d at 1281: Sterman, 785 F.2d at 166.
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section 16 are unclear, particularly while in a state of 'War" on
insider trading. The focus of this section is the SEC's newly adopt-
ed position exempting pre-insider transactions by officers and
directors from section 16, and the policy implications flowing
therefrom.
When an officer or director makes offsetting trades within a
period of less than six months, the section 16 reporting and short-
swing profit liability rules apply.2"' Section 16 reporting and lia-
bility exposure also arises when one of the trades occurs at the
time of insider status and when the matching transaction occurs
after termination of insider status. °4 Where, however, one of the
trades takes place before the officer or director assumes insider
status, the applicability of section 16 is less certain.
B. 1991 Rule Changes and the SEC's
Shift in Policy
The section 16 rule amendments, promulgated in 1991, reflect
a dramatic change in SEC policy on the issue of pre-insider trades
by officers and directors. Prior to the 1991 amendments, the Com-
mission required officers or directors to disclose trades which were
conducted prior to becoming an insider.0 5 In particular, former
rule 16a-l(d) (which has now been replaced by rule 16a-2(a))
required officers and directors to disclose all trades conducted six
months prior to attaining insider status.206 The rule's objective
was to dissuade officers and directors from taking advantage of
information gained upon becoming an officer or director; there-
fore, transactions engaged in while acting as an officer or director
were offset by transactions made shortly before attaining such
insider status. 27 In the release proposing the 1991 rule changes,
it appeared that the Commission would continue to effectuate this
policy. Rule 16a-2(a), as proposed, would have required officers
203 See JAcoBs, supra note 39, § 3.03.
204 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1991); see, e.g., Lewis v. Mellon Bank, 513 F.2d 921, 924
(3d Cir. 1975); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1969) (transactions by officers after they cease to hold office are
subject to § 16 if executed within six months of a transaction that occurred while that
officer was an insider).
205 See former rule 16a-l(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(d) (1990).
206 Id.
207 Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,433, at 89,602. (Dec. 2, 1988) (proposing release).
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and directors to disclose all trades conducted in the six-month
period prior to attaining insider status."'
In adopting the 1991 rule amendments, however, the Commis-
sion, with little explanation, abandoned long-standing policy.2"
In the release, the Commission was persuaded by the comments
submitted that the disclosure of officer and director transactions
prior to attaining insider status should no longer be required.
Subjecting those persons to liability, the SEC reasoned, even
though they may not have known at the time of the transaction
that they would become officers and directors in the future, was
unduly harsh." Therefore, rule 16a-2(a) provides, with one ma-
jor exception, 1 that transactions occurring prior to the date a
person becomes an officer or director are not subject to the re-
porting and liability provisions of section 16.2 The SEC's
change of position not only conflicts with its prior policy but also
with the overwhelming case law on this issue, dating back more
than thirty years.
C. Case Law
In light of section 16(b)'s statutory language requiring that a
ten percent beneficial owner be such, both at the time of the
"purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security, "21
it may be argued, by negative implication, that an officer or di-
rector must be such at the time of only one such transaction This
position has been adopted by all major courts that have addressed
this issue.2 14 As the First Circuit opined in a relatively recent de-
cision: "[A]n officer or director need only hold the position at the
208 Id.
209 Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 27,148, 11989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I
84,439, at 80,384 (Aug. 18, 1989) (reproposing release).
210 Id.
211 Rule 16a-2(a) continues to apply § 16 to transactions by officers and directors
that take place within six months before the issuer's registration of a class of equity secu-
rities under § 12 of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(a) (1991). See infra notes
233-41 and accompanying text.
212 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(a) (1991).
213 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
214 See, e.g., Arrow Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.
1986); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 266 (2d. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1959); Blau v. Allen,
163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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time of purchase or sale to be a statutory insider."215 In another
relatively recent decision, the Fifth Circuit adhered to this ap-
proach.216  And, in perhaps the seminal case, Adler v.
Klawans,"1 ' the Second Circuit held that, where a director pur-
chases before assuming office and sells within the "short-swing" pe-
riod during his tenure, section 16(b) liability will attach.218
According to Adler, the Congress intended for section 16(b) to dis-
courage widespread abuse of fiduciary relations and specifically to
deter officers, directors, and ten percent beneficial owners from
making improper use of information gained in a representative
capacity.21 9 Moreover, the Second Circuit in Adler asserted that
the language of section 16 was so clear that it was unnecessary to
examine legislative history to determine whether Congress intend-
ed pre-insider transactions by officers or directors to be subject to
section 16(b).220 Section 16(b) states that: "This subsection shall
not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial
owner was not such both at the time of purchase and sale."
221
Hence, the court felt that the presence of this emphatic state-
ment, along with the absence of such a requirement with respect
to officers or directors, demonstrated a clear legislative intent that
no such limitation be applied to the latter.22 In sum, the court
believed that it was Congress's purpose to "reach a 'purchase and
sale' or 'sale and purchase' within a six month period by someone
within one of the proscribed categories, [such as] one who was a
director [or] officer . . . at some time. "223 As reflected in Adler, ap-
plying section 16(b) to pre-insider trades by officers and directors
215 Riseman v. Orion Research, Inc., 749 F.2d 915, 917 (1st Cir. 1984).
216 Arrow Distrib. Corp., 783 F.2d at 1279 ("[An insider's short-swing transaction is
subject to Section 16(b) if the insider has held his corporate position at either the time
of his purchase or the time of his sale.").
217 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
218 Id.; see also Riseman, 749 F.2d at 917 ("An officer or director need only hold the
position at the time of purchase or sale to be a statutory insider.").
219 Adler, 267 F.2d at 844.
220 Id.
221 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b); see § 16(b), supra note 17.
222 Adler, 267 F.2d at 845; see JACOBS, supra note 39, § 3.03.
223 Adler, 267 F.2d at 845 (emphasis in original); see also Arrow Distrib. Corp. v.
Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1986) (Examining congressional intent, the
Fifth Circuit held that "an insider's short-swing transaction is subject to Section 16(b) if
the insider has held his corporate position at either the time of his purchase or the
time of his sale.") (citing Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970)).
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advances congressional intent and is consonant with the purposes
and policies underlying section 16(b). 224
In holding that a director's or officer's purchases and sales
before assuming office are subject to section 16(b), the courts
have rejected an analysis looking to the intent of the acting party.
In Blau v. Allen, for example, the court stated that a purchaser
"need not have access to inside information in entering into his
initial transaction."226 The court held that the defendant's specu-
lation, having become an insider by virtue of becoming a director,
was a "vice within the purview of Section 16(b)."227  Several
courts have followed Allen's rationale. 2 ' Refusing to examine a
party's subjective intent comports with Congress's purpose in en-
acting section 16 which holds insiders strictly liable for their short-




Although it seems from the language of section 16(b) that
ten percent beneficial owners are to be treated differently than
officers or directors,211 there may not be a sufficient justification
for this apparent distinction. An argument can be made that, with
respect to all such persons covered under the statute, section
16(b) liability should not be imposed when the initial transaction
is entered into prior to acquiring insider status.
224 Adler, 267 F.2d at 844.
225 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
226 Id. at 704.
227 Id. (quoting Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954)).
228 See, e.g., Arrow Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1986).
229 Id. at 1281 ("[N]either actual use of insider information nor intention to exploit
such information is required to establish § 16(b) liability."); Allen, 163 F. Supp. at 705
("Motive is immaterial in determining liability under section 16(b)." (citing Stella v. Gra-
ham-Paige Motorts Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955))); Sterman v. Ferro Corp.,
785 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Section 16(b) imposes a strict liability upon transac-
tions coming within its parameters and this court has long recognized that consideration
of issues such as motive, intent and the use or abuse of inside information is irrelevant
in analyzing actions under its mandates.").
230 Recall the exemptive proviso to §'16(b) which states that "this subsection shall
not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security in-
volved . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988); see Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec.
Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
These cases are discussed in MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND
REMEDIES § 4.05 (1992).
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The statute seeks to prevent the unfair use of information by
one who has a sufficiently close relationship to the issuing corpo-
ration. Just why an officer or director who has made a purchase
previous to having acquired his position is any more likely to sub-
sequently trade on inside information than an outsider who attains
insider status by virtue of having bought ten percent of the
corporation's outstanding stock, is never clearly articulated, neither
in the statute on its face, nor in the legislative history accompany-
ing the statute, nor in judicial opinions examining this issue. It
can be further argued that there is a philosophical inconsistency
in taking an overly rigid approach here, where elsewhere the
courts have been receptive to adopting a pragmatic approach
when they are analyzing whether certain unorthodox transactions
can be deemed purchases and sales within the meaning of the
statute.231 Nonetheless, a key distinction exists: a director or an
executive officer, by the nature of her position alone, normally
has access to inside information while the same does not necessari-
ly hold true for a ten percent beneficial owner. Hence, the inher-
ent access to inside information that directors and executive offi-
cers enjoy, in conjunction with the statute's policy of deterring
fiduciaries from making improper use of information gained in
their representative capacity, requires that the statute be interpret-
ed as subjecting pre-insider transactions by such insiders to section
16(b).
It is difficult to understand the SEC's change in policy, result-
ing in the exemption of pre-insider transactions by officers and
directors from section 16, when respected case law clearly estab-
lishes that section 16(b) is applicable to pre-insider trades of offi-
cers and directors. Explaining its decision, the SEC cited the con-
cerns of commentators that "disclosure of officer or director trans-
actions before attaining insider status is unnecessarily harsh in that
it subjects those persons to liability, even though they may not
have known at the time of the transactions that they would be-
231 See S. REP. NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). For cases applying the prag-
matic approach, see, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582 (1973); Heublein. Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 722 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983); Texas
lnt'l Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1983); Portnoy v. Memorex
Corp., 667 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1982). For scholarly commentary on this issue, see Thom-
as L. Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C.
L. REv. 1 (1975); STEINBERG, supra note 230, § 4.06; Timothy Tomlinson, Section 16(b): A
Single Analysis of Purchases and Sales - Merging the Objective and Pragmatic Analyses, 1981
DUKE L.J. 941.
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come officers or directors in the future."23 2 The simple answer
to. this concern is that a person assuming officer or director status
will not incur section 16 liability so long as the insider complies
with the provisions of that statute. In such event, the insider need
only wait the designated time period before engaging in the offset-
ting transaction(s). Hence, in accepting a fiduciary position such
as that of a principal executive in a publicly held company, one
should expect to incur certain obligations. One such obligation is
to refrain from engaging in short-swing trading. The fact that a
prospective officer or director did not anticipate being made sub-
ject to the limitations of section 16 should not change the result.
1. Rule 16a-2(a)'s Inconsistency with Congressional Policy
Underlying Section 16(b)
A persuasive argument can be set forth that the SEC's deci-
sion to exclude pre-insider trades by 'officers and directors from
section 16 runs afoul of the policies underlying section 16(b).
Section 16(b)'s focus is on deterring officers, directors, and ten
percent beneficial owners from making improper use of informa-
tion gained in a representative capacity.2 13 It is obvious that a
person need not be a statutory insider at the time of both the
purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) in order to engage in
this sort of speculative conduct. If the insider receives and uses
material nonpublic information in only the trade made after at-
taining insider status, such insider still has engaged in activity that
is contrary to the rationale 'underlying section 16(b). 2 4 By en-
abling officers and directors to use inside information to offset
pre-insider trades, the SEC minimizes section 16(b)'s remedial
focus.
In addition to the assertion that the Commission's action
contravenes the congressional purpose underlying section 16(b),
rule 16a-2(a) is not only internally inconsistent but also inconsis-
tent with other positions adopted by the SEC. The internal incon-
sistency exists because at the same time rule 16a-2(a) excludes the
applicability of section 16 to pre-insider transactions, it continues
to apply section 16 to transactions by officers and directors that
take place within six months before the subject issuer's registration
232 Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, supra note 209, at 80,384.
233 See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
234 See jACOBs, supra note 39, § 3.03.
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of a class of equity securities under section 12 of the Exchange
Act.2 5 The Commission justifies this position on the rationale
that "[i]nsiders of private companies should be well aware of plans
to register under section 12 sufficiently in advance to take poten-
tial section 16 responsibilities into account in buying and selling
issuer securities."2 6 In making this statement, the SEC's focus
evidently is on the insider's awareness of his potential section
16(b) liability. If so, the Commission's perception is misplaced. As
the prevailing case law makes abundantly clear, the Commission's
focus should be on the underlying purpose of section 16(b) which
is to deter and prevent insider trading. The culpability of the
alleged violator is not a relevant factor in ascertaining one's obli-
gations and liabilities under section 16.237
On a practical level, the SEC's distinction between officer and
director transactions which occur six months prior to an issuer go-
ing public, 23 8 and trades occurring just before the officer or di-
rector otherwise takes office, is not persuasive. The concern in
each of these transactions is that the insider will use nonpublic
information to which the insider is now privy to offset a trade
made before the individual had access to such information. Elimi-
nating the applicability of section 16 to one such transaction while
applying it to the other is inconsistent with the statute's purpose.
In Arrow Distribution Corp. v. Baumgartner,239 for example, the
Fifth Circuit recognized the similarity of the two types of transac-
tions and the necessity of applying section 16(b) to both.24
Baumgartner reaches the proper result because it subjects these two
analogous transactions to section 16(b). This decision furthers the
235 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(a) (1991).
236 Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders,
supra note 209, at 80,384.
237 See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); see cases cited supra note
229.
238 "Going public" is a process whereby an issuer embarks upon a plan of financing
in which securities are sold to the public. MARC 1. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIEs
LAW 249 (1989). "The issuer thereby becomes subject to the reporting requirements of
the Exchange Act." Id. The first public offering of securities that an issuer makes is re-
ferred to as an "initial public offering." By doing so the issuer "goes public" and be-
comes subject to the Exchange Act's reporting obligations. Id at 249-51.
239 783 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1986).
240 Id. at 1279. While asserting that "short-swing transactions effected by a director or
officer are subject to § 16(b) even though the issuer's securities were registered under §
12(g) of the Act only at the time of purchase or sale," the court also concluded that "an
insider's short-swing transaction is subject to § 16(b) if the insider has held his corporate
position at either the time of his purchase or the time of his sale." Id
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underlying purpose of section 16 which is to prevent insiders from
profiting from the use of nonpublic information.
2. Rule 16a-2(a)'s Inconsistency with Other Positions Adopted by
the SEC
In addition to being internally inconsistent, rule 16a-2(a) is
inconsistent with other positions adopted by the SEC. For exam-
ple, rule 16a-2(b) subjects offsetting transactions following the
cessation of director or officer status to section 16 if executed
within six months of a transaction that occurred while that person
was a director or officer.241 This rule acknowledges that it is un-
necessary for an individual to have insider status when she engages
in both trades in order to be a party whose trades are the type
section 16(b) seeks to oversee. While the SEC acknowledges in
rule 16a-2(a) that one may use inside information ascertained
when one was an officer or director to execute a trade after insid-
er status is terminated, it apparently does not want to recognize
that insiders may use inside information in effecting transactions
once insider status is attained to offset transactions executed be-
fore attaining insider status. 242
E. Summation
Congress's intent, as interpreted by the courts and which is
clear from the plain language of the statute, is that section 16(b)
applies to a person's transactions which occur prior to that indi-
241 17 C.AR. § 240.16a-2(b) (1991); see, e.g., Lewis v. Mellon Bank, 513 F.2d 921, 924
(3d Cir. 1975); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1969) (transactions by officers after they cease to hold office are
subject to § 16 if executed within six months of a transaction that occurred while that
officer was an insider).
On the other hand, where both transactions occur within a six month period after
an officer or director has terminated such status, no § 16(b) liability will be found. See
Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1974); Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
242 In the reproposing release on the § 16 rule amendments, the SEC seemed to
recognize the significance of the rule change it was about to make. The Commission's
concern over the reproposed rule is reflected in the comments that were solicited. The
SEC asked for comment, for example, on whether it was preferable to maintain the then
existing § 16 regimen on this subject, or alternatively, to subject pre-insider transactions
to § 16 only when the person knows or has reason to know that he or she will become
an officer or director. Furthermore, the SEC asked for comment on whether pre-insider
trades should be exempt from both § 16(a) and § 16(b), or only from the short-swing
profit recovery provisions of § 16(b). Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Direc-
tors and Principal Stockholders, supra note 209, at 80,384.
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vidual assuming a position as an officer or director. This policy is
in accordance with the purpose of section 16. The SEC rule ex-
empting officer and director pre-insider transactions from section
16 directly contradicts the congressional purpose of deterring
persons having insider status from using nonpublic information
when engaging in securities transactions. Furthermore, the rule
creating the exemption is internally inconsistent and inconsistent
with other positions taken by the SEC. In sum, it appears that the
Commission has made a policy decision benefiting prospective
insiders while ignoring the risk that such persons will use their
access to nonpublic information in order to offset trades made
shortly before they attained their insider status. Therefore, it ap-
pears that the SEC has exceeded its rulemaking authority by insti-
tuting this policy.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on recent judicial and SEC actions
that limit section 16's scope. In particular, the Commission's
rulemaking endeavors may strike one as surprising. Given that
section 16 is an explicit congressional directive to combat insider
trading, one logically would conclude that the Commission would
interpret the statute so as to effectuate its remedial objective. This
is particularly the case in view of the SEC's declared war on in-
sider trading. Yet, while seeking to expand the parameters of such
antifraud provisions as section 10(b) and rule 14e-3, 45 the SEC
has relaxed the mandates of section 16.
This development, albeit puzzling, is not an isolated one.
Recently, in the midst of an election year, the Commission passed
amendments to its limited offering rules,244 the effect of which is
to expose the exceptions previously in effect.2 145 The ostensible
243 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1991) (broad rule prohibiting trading on or tipping of in-
side information in the tender offer context). The rule was upheld by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1759 (1992). See O'Conner & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Samuel H. Gruenbaum, The New Disclose or Abstain from Trading Rule: Has
the SEC Gone Too Far?, 4 CORP. L. REV. 350 (1981); Theodore A. Levine et al., Multiservice
Securities Firms: Coping with Conflicts in a Tender Offer Context, 23 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 41
(1988); Note, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 CEO. WASH. L.
REV. 539 (1981).
244 Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949 (July 30, 1992); see also
Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman, Securities Act Release Nos. 6925, [1991-
1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,932 (March 18, 1992).
245 Among other things, the amendments drastically modified the Regulation A and
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purpose underlying these amendments is to facilitate capital for-
mation by small business.24 Although this is certainly a laudable
objective, the SEC is not a Chamber of Commerce. Its role is to
protect the investing public and the integrity of the securities
markets.2 47
There may be a disconcerting trend taking place: The SEC,
while energetically enforcing the antifraud provisions, may be
bowing to pressure from business interests to relax some of the
"technical" aspects of securities regulation. Hopefully, this in fact is
not the situation. In its wisdom, Congress declined to enact securi-
ties statutes solely concerned with fraud. Rather, the securities laws
address a wider range of conduct and establish a broad array of
remedial and punitive measures to respond to proscribed con-
duct.24 It is the SEC's responsibility to vigorously implement
these congressional mandates. Hopefully, rather than shirking
from this obligation, the Commission will act in the manner that
Congress directed.
Rule 504 exemptions from registration. See Kenneth J. Bialkin, Defending the SEC from
Deregulators,' NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 20.
246 See Small Business Initiatives, supra note 244, at 2; Separate Statement of Com-
missioner Fleischman, supra note 244, at 3.
247 See, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979). For further discussion, see
Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO.
LJ. 163 (1979).
248 These measures are addressed in two treatises by the author. See STEINBERG &
FERRARA, supra note 2; STEINBERG, supra note 230; see also ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D.
LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIEs FRAUD (1991).
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